Introduction
Ireland, in common with many other EU countries, has been characterised by decades of state monopolisation and the unhindered development of private monopolies in an environment of lax or non-existent competition enforcement.
2 Against this background, enforcement of abuse of dominance provisions could be expected to be a target-rich activity, yielding great dividends.
Consistent with this economic setting, public enforcement by the European Commission has resulted in findings of abuse of dominance against (usually State-owned) firms, albeit in a handful of cases. As the mainstay of enforcement until recently, private enforcement of competition under domestic legislation has only resulted in one case of abuse being found despite much litigation. Against this contrasting landscape, domestic public enforcement commenced recently and we are shortly likely to learn which of these patterns it follows more closely.
This paper documents the development of enforcement of abuse of dominance provisions in Ireland as described above and examine the relevance of this experience to 
II. Economic Background and History
Competition law enforcement in Ireland has historically been weak. Prior to 1991, Irish competition law relied largely on a system of regulation of restrictive practices. The scale of concentration has been and remains considerable. For example:
• State-owned monopolies existed in telecommunications, post, energy, transport, health insurance, television, sugar and forestry;
• State-owned firms operated in industries such as banking, steel, fertilisers and life assurance;
• The privately-owned cement company enjoyed a statutory monopoly
• A leading firm has a share above 50% in the newspapers, beer, whiskey and other spirits, impulse ice-cream, cement, liquid milk, liquid petroleum gas, industrial cleaning and industrial gasses sectors; and
• Markets that are highly concentrated (i.e., the largest four firms have in excess of 80% of the market) include supermarkets, distribution of food, newsprint distribution, banking, soft drinks and outdoor advertising.
Furthermore there are instances of local (e.g., regional) markets where concentration is particularly high. Concentration has become so common that many people appear to believe that small economies must necessarily have highly concentrated markets. This conclusion is reached without any analysis of scale. In addition concentration is not solely a historical phenomenon. Recently state agencies have been involved in plans to 3 Hogan G. (1991) .
"rationalise" the already concentrated dairy and beef processing sectors 4 with a view to increasing concentration. Cir. 1945 ). 7 Economists use the term "rent" to refer to returns in excess of productivity. Monopoly profit is an example. Rent-seeking refers to socially wasteful activities aimed at developing or retaining rent (e.g., lobbying or litigating to retain a monopoly). X-inefficiency arises because monopoly profits get wasted via internal inefficiencies instead of being passed on to shareholders. that where the alleged abuse is a failure to provide a service, it must be shown that the dominant undertaking was manifestly incapable of satisfying the demand prevailing on the market for its services. The Court held that the fact that the applicant had secured 2% of the market did not prove this, as there would always be farmers who seek an alternative service, or simply would like to give their custom to a neighbour.
III. Private Enforcement
A large number of cases have been decided on non-competition grounds. This is especially so in cases where the defendant is state-owned or also plays a regulatory role.
A. In Zockoll v. Telecom Eireann 17 , the plaintiff had been refused supply of over 250 free phone "vanity" numbers (e.g, 1800 FLOWERS) by the fixed line telephone monopoly, Telecom Eireann (now called Eircom). The competition issues were not considered at all, the court having found that the defendant had exceeded its powers in withdrawing the plaintiffs free-phone numbers. Telecom Eireann could only do this if: (a) the subscriber was in breach of his contract with the defendant, or (b) circumstances existed which in the interests of some revision of the telecommunications service made it necessary to change the subscriber's telephone number. In Masterfoods, Keane J decided that the relevant market was impulse ice-cream:
"I reach that conclusion largely on what has been described as the 'commonsense' or 'innate characteristics' test. I do not think that somebody going into a confectioner's or newsagent to buy an ice-cream who finds the cabinet temporarily empty would treat their appetite as slacked by a can of coke or a bag of crisps. They are far more likely to cross the road to the nearest sweet shop and get their ice cream there"
In this the Court relied also on marketing surveys, and seasonal factors. However, the Court appeared less impressed with econometric evidence:
"As to the cross-elasticity of demand criterion, to which much expert evidence was directed, it may be that … [the] … econometric study could be said, at least in a negative sense, to confirm the 'commonsense' test. Ultimately, however, I think that the acknowledged incapacity of that procedure to embrace all the significant variables which would have to be taken into account significantly reduces its value"
In Meridian v. Eircell, O'Higgins, J. found that Eircell, the incumbent mobile operator with 58% market share and a single competitor was not dominant. 21 If a firm that buys from a dominant firm and sells on to consumers is overcharged, it still may not be able to recover damages because the dominant firm may claim that it passed the price increase onto consumers and that only final consumers can claim damages. In US federal law (but not generally in State law), the rule is that only the direct purchaser has standing to sue for damages: The significance of the large market share of Eircell is greatly diminished in the light of the dramatic decline of such share over such a relatively short period. The significance of the low number of competitors is diminished by the fact that Digifone is a strong company, well placed to exploit any laxity on the part of Eircell. I accept that the size of a competitor is not necessarily a relevant consideration in all cases for determining whether or not the firm can exert competitive restraint on a rival, but in this case, the strengths of Digifone are relevant in the assessment of Eircell's capacity to act to an appreciable extent independently of it. The significance of high barriers to entry in the market is vastly reduced by the fact that barriers to expansion are so low. Because of this, Eircell's capacity to act to an appreciable extent independently of its rivals is greatly reduced. Therefore, the structural aspect of the market which might in the abstract provide very strong evidence of dominance by Eircell, do not justify such a conclusion when applied to the particular market with which we are concerned in this case. The level of vertical integration of Eircell and the considerable influence it exercises over the route to market do not alter my view.
He also relied on behavioural evidence: "The fall in prices, the dramatic decline in market share, the evidence of "leapfrogging" in tariff reduction, the general tendency towards price convergence, the incentives to compete, the fact that so many subscribers are new and therefore independent, and the number and scale of innovations are the most important matters relied upon … as indicating competition."
He also rejected a claim that high prices would support a finding of dominance.
"…even if it were proven that prices were comparatively high, that would not necessarily prove lack of competition. Still less will such evidence prove that Eircell were dominant in the market. … even were I to accept that prices were (a) comparatively high and (b) too high, this might indicate that the true level of competition had yet to be attained, but it would not necessarily show that Eircell was acting to an appreciable extent independently of it's competitor."
This judgement illustrates a willingness to avoid a structural approach to dominance based on market shares alone although, until we see a case where dominance is found despite relatively low market share, it could be just as easily be indicative of a very high burden on plaintiffs.
Discussion
Given the economic background, it is puzzling that private litigants have failed to bring home some good cases given the background of monopolisation. How might this be explained?
1 One possibility is that private litigation is inherently flawed. Private enforcement is most prominent in the US, and proponents of private enforcement look there for evidence of its success. While a detailed examination of private enforcement is beyond the scope of this paper, a cursory look suggests that it's apparent success may be illusory.
24
US private enforcement has generally "piggy-backed" on public cases, both because the government generally does not seek damages on behalf of injured private parties (leaving a need for private enforcement) and because government cases resolved through guilty pleas or finding of guilt provide a presumption of violation in subsequent private cases. Thus much of the private litigation in the US concerns not whether the law is broken, but the assessment of damages. Much of that litigation relates to damages in cartels cases, which are intrinsically different to monopoly abuse cases. In non-cartel cases, the record of success is very limited. If it is the case that private enforcement has not been hugely successful in an environment where it is assisted by rules on triple damages, class action law suits, clarity on standing (e.g., Illinois Brick) and different cost rules, then it is extremely difficult to see that private enforcement will succeed in an environment like Ireland where these additional advantages are not present. There is a further concern 25 that the discovery process may make it difficult for private parties to get crucial information that they need in order to determine if the law has been breached. The Authority has recently begun to publish reasoned decisions in cases where has not brought proceedings in order to provide guidance for business and legal counsel. These relate both to cases where the parties agree to change behaviour and to cases where a substantial investigation does not reveal an infringement of the Act. 31 A longer-term strategy of the Authority is to produce guidelines on abuse of dominance not unlike those it recently produced on mergers.
32
The Authority has considered, in general terms, the possibility of entering an amicus curiae brief in a private case in order to exploit the complementarity between private and public
litigation. There appears to be no legal barrier to such an amicus brief, and the fact that 30 Competition was a new policy area and in all likelihood the contribution that greater competition could make to economic growth and national competitiveness was under appreciated in Government. See Fingleton J (2001) , supra, fn. 5. 31 E/02/002 The increase in the wholesale price of electronic top-up by Vodafone Ireland Limited and E/02/001 The reduction in Travel Agents' commission by Aer Lingus plc at http://www/tca.ie. 32 The Authority's merger guidelines are available on its website http://www.tca.ie.
the Modernisation Regulation envisages a role for amicus briefs may further encourage the Authority.
33
The state-backed origin of many existing monopolies has blurred the lines between the enforcement and advocacy functions of the Authority. Advocacy may be more effective in that a decision by the State to liberalise a sector (and even better to implement liberalisation with enthusiasm) and pro-consumer focus may be a faster remedy to develop competition than a long and expensive court case. Advocacy may even be the favoured option in an environment where there are no sanctions from enforcement and where the courts have tended to resolve cases on regulatory or other non-competition grounds. On the other hand, if advocacy is not backed by the possibility of enforcement, there is the danger that liberalisation will not be fully effective.
An example of this was a case involving the dominant electricity company awarding one of just two entry possibilities to the generation market to its own subsidiary joint venture.
In June 2001, the Authority endeavoured to have the Minister concerned use a commitment she had extracted as owner to rectify the potential abuse. The Minister declined to do so. The fact that the Authority did not bring proceedings in that case was based on a sense that the resolution of the matter was urgent and that it was not clear, in the absence of fines, that the court could offer a suitable remedy. Failure of this type of advocacy would be likely to incline the Authority towards enforcement in similar cases in future.
Similarly, the Authority has been prepared to support the introduction of competition via regulatory liberalisation but disillusionment with the pace of that reform may incline the Authority to be more aggressive. (Only in airlines and mobile telephone has there been any serious impact on incumbent market share).
Overall, there appears to be no shortage of dominant firms in Ireland (and in this, Ireland may be no different from many other EU member states). Yet, in many years of private enforcement, firms have rarely been found to be dominant and even more rarely to have abused that position. Public enforcement was not deemed necessary until recently and, even when introduced, it has taken some years for resources to be allocated.
The outcome of upcoming public enforcement actions will do a great deal to determine whether Ireland remains a safe place to hold a dominant position.
V.

Wider Relevance
The Irish experience of, and relative lack of success with, enforcement of abuse of dominance provisions may have wider relevance to international convergence, modernisation of EU competition policy, and enlargement of the EU.
International convergence and the question of what is harm to competition
Some argue that differences in public enforcement approaches across countries are explained by differences in appreciation of "what is harm to competition?". This hypothesis is most popularly expounded in regard to differences between the public enforcement agencies in the United States and the European Union, although this is merely the focus point for a wider debate.
34 It is at its most crystallised in the merger area, but in most instances the arguments apply equally to monopoly.
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The most stylised version of the hypothesis regarding EU-US divergence is that the US has a narrower construction of harm to competition that requires showing harm to consumers via reduction in output. In contrast, the EU approach still puts weight on harm to the competitive process or, even broader, harm to competitors. Two examples may help to illustrate.
First, consider a market in which a previously state protected monopoly has been exposed to entry. Laying off workers is typically costly in the EU 36 . While this is simply a transfer, it may have effects on the competitive process. For example, a monopoly may rationally prefer to undercut entrants because this is cheaper than paying the redundancy costs. The decision on an allegation of predatory pricing could well turn on whether the incumbent's costs include the opportunity cost of redundancy. If the opportunity cost of redundancy is excluded, the incumbent will appear more efficient. If there were genuine stranded costs, welfare might be higher in the short term from this undercutting policy.
But in the long-term, the negative signals sent to the entrant, and the positive signal sent that monopoly is rewarded, may reduce welfare more because of damage to the competitive process.
The second example concerns an incumbent monopoly with an advantage over rivals in an ancillary market. Consider for example a public utility whose billing system and detailed customer records give it advantages in marketing and assessing the credit risk of consumers. Consider also that it can use these advantages to price lower in an equipment market (e.g., electricity company selling washing machines). Suppose finally that privacy law prevents the sharing of these advantages with rivals and that they are unique to that utility. Again, how should a competition authority assess a complaint by the rival sellers of equipment about below cost selling?
Economic efficiency would suggest that the incumbent monopoly is lower cost and should be allowed to use its advantages to offer lower prices to consumers. On the other hand, allowing an incumbent monopolist to expand into ancillary markets could send very negative signals about liberalisation. Some competition authorities will reasonably prioritise the positive signal about the competitive process, even at some cost to consumers in higher prices.
These examples could easily be confused with protection of competitors rather than protection of competition, but I think this interpretation could be overly simplistic. In countries where the competitive process has been restrained and restricted by government action, the long-term development of competition might justify placing more concern on Type I error. In other words, a competition authority enforcing the law against a background of state intervention might rightly be more concerned with false negatives (incorrectly finding that there is no abuse) than false positives (incorrectly finding that there is abuse). 37 This may reflect a fundamental difference between the US and the EU in terms of whether the appropriate role of competition policy involves helping to kick-start competition, especially in markets where a dominant incumbent has enjoyed historical State protection from competition.
Regulation 1/2003
The history of enforcement in Ireland raises an important question regarding consistency 39 The experience with private enforcement in Ireland has been disappointing, but it may be that it takes time to develop and that it only develops well in an environment of mature public enforcement.
I do not believe that these divergences are obstacles to the modernisation process. On the contrary, by drawing attention to divergences in procedures and sanctions, they are more likely to result in forces to strengthen the process further.
Enlargement of the EU and the Challenges for Accession Countries
The Irish experience may also be relevant to applicant countries, both because they are small and because the economic policy debate in those countries may be led, as it is in Ireland, with a focus on national competitiveness that is typical of small open economies.
Many if not all the applicant countries will share the Irish economic background of high concentration and widespread monopoly. They may also have the deep footprint of state ownership and protection across the economy. This means that they share the need for vigorous enforcement. Competition Authorities, and those formulating policy, should be reluctant to accept simplistic arguments that concentration must necessarily be higher in small economies. This may be a particularly serious problem in small open economies where a focus on industrial policy (even planning) and national competitiveness may reduce competition policy to a secondary role. An extremely difficult task for such an authority is to get the balance between advocacy and enforcement right. Advocacy can be a more powerful and immediate tool. The correct balance will depend on the political climate and judicial attitudes. If politicians are keen on competition, and judges keen to resolve matters on the regulatory side, then advocacy should win. On the other hand, ministers happy to allow the Courts become the main battlefield for competition and vigorous competition judges will encourage enforcement.
Conclusion
Much of the debate about international divergence in standards fails to take account of the different legal and economic environments in which competition authorities operate.
The big problems in Ireland, and probably in many other European countries, still stem from lack of effective sanction against monopolisation, and not from any fear of excessive enforcement against firms that have obtained high market shares by virtue of vigorous competition and efficiency. This may change as competition law matures.
Public enforcement has a central role to play in ensuring that the extraordinarily concentrated landscape of Irish markets is not inimical to competition.
